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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 08-3326
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIE ANDREW HAMPTON,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cr-00352-001)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 29, 2009
Before: SMITH, FISHER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 2, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Willie Andrew Hampton pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), and the District Court sentenced him to
180 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Hampton challenges the District Court’s

credibility determinations and subsequent denial of his motion to suppress, the
applicability of an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, and the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
The circumstances giving rise to Hampton’s conviction occurred on January 16,
2006, when three Clairton Police Department officers, Officer Sean McGrail, Officer
Michael Merlino, and Officer Richard Bonczek, conducted the traffic stop of a rented
minivan based on an allegedly inoperable passenger side brake light. Norman Collins
was driving the vehicle, and Hampton was a passenger. During the stop, the officers,
discovering that neither the driver nor Hampton had a valid driver’s license, decided to
impound the minivan. Officer McGrail asked Collins to step out of the vehicle, while
Officers Merlino and Bonczek explicitly instructed Hampton to remain inside the
minivan. Hampton refused to do so, and a struggle ensued. During the scuffle, one of the
officers felt a gun and notified his colleagues. It took all three officers to finally
overcome Hampton. After subduing and securing him, the police found two loaded 9mm
handguns on Hampton’s person and discovered that Hampton was wearing a bulletproof
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vest underneath his coat. Hampton was subsequently charged as being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).
Hampton filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the firearms were obtained in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. At the suppression hearing, Officer McGrail
testified that he conducted the traffic stop due to an unlit passenger side brake light and
that he communicated the problem to Collins. (App. at 76-77.) He also explained why he
did not relay the problem in his radio transmission: “It’s a practice of mine [that] I never
broadcast the reason for my traffic stops.” (App. at 91.) Gary W. McDonough, a coowner of the rental service that rented the minivan, testified that the minivan’s brake
lights appeared to be working both before and after the incident, but conceded that it was
possible for a loose wire to cause the light to operate intermittently. (App. at 109-11,
140.) At a second suppression hearing,1 Collins testified that the police did not
demonstrate to him that the brake light was inoperable (App. at 177), while Officer
McGrail reiterated his testimony that he informed Collins of the unlit brake light. (App.
at 215-16.) The District Court, finding Officer McGrail’s testimony credible and Collins’
testimony not credible, denied the motion to suppress. (App. at 7, 9.)
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In light of Officer McGrail’s testimony at the original suppression hearing,
Hampton filed a motion to reopen the record so that Collins could be called to testify to
his knowledge of the brake light’s condition. The District Court granted the request and
scheduled a second suppression hearing.
3

Hampton eventually pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The Plea Agreement contained an
express waiver of Hampton’s appellate rights, with several discrete exceptions:
“Willie Andrew Hampton waives the right to take a direct appeal from his
conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. §1291 or 18 U.S.C. § 3742, subject
to the following exceptions:
(a) If the United States appeals from the sentence, Willie Andrew
Hampton may take a direct appeal from the sentence.
(b) If (1) the sentence exceeds the applicable statutory limits set forth
in the United States Code, or (2) the sentence unreasonably exceeds
the guideline range determined by the Court under the Sentencing
Guidelines, Willie Andrew Hampton may take a direct appeal from
the sentence.
(c) As a condition of his guilty plea, Willie Andrew Hampton may
take a direct appeal from his conviction limited to the following two
issues: (1) whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause, either on its face or as applied in this case; and
(2) whether the traffic stop violated the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights. . . .
The foregoing reservations of the right to appeal on the basis of specified
issues do not include the right to raise issues other than those specified.”
(App. at 280-81, ¶9.) At the plea hearing, Hampton stated that he understood that the
judge had yet to calculate his sentence, which could be more or less severe than the
sentencing guideline range. (App. at 260-61.) Thereafter, the Government repeated the
Plea Agreement, including the appellate waiver, in open court. (App. at 261-63.)
The Presentence Investigation Report classified Hampton as an armed career
criminal under § 924(e) due to his three prior serious drug offense convictions.
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Hampton’s final offense level of 31 and criminal history category of IV, combined with
the 15-year statutory minimum pursuant to § 924(e), yielded a sentencing guideline range
of 180 to 188 months of imprisonment. The District Court sentenced Hampton to 180
months of imprisonment, and Hampton filed a timely appeal.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s judgment of sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. “We review a District Court’s denial of a motion to
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s application of the law to those facts.” United States v. Lockett,
406 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). However, we will not set aside a District Court’s
credibility determination when supported by the record. United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d
164, 177 (3d Cir. 1998). Although we exercise plenary review over the constitutionality
of the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act, United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d
71, 75 (3d Cir. 2007), we must determine as a threshold matter whether Hampton’s
appellate waiver prevents us from exercising our jurisdiction to review the merits of
Hampton’s appeal, United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 926 (3d Cir. 2008). Finally, we
exercise plenary review over the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). United States
v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2001).
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III.
On appeal, Hampton raises three challenges to his judgment of sentence. First, he
argues that the District Court committed clear error by denying Hampton’s motion to
suppress. Second, he contends that the District Court violated his Equal Protection rights
under the Fifth Amendment by counting his prior convictions as three under the Armed
Career Criminal Act. Lastly, he argues that Congress exceeded its power under the
Commerce Clause in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We will address each contention in
turn.
A.
Hampton argues that the District Court committed clear error when it determined
that the minivan had an unlit brake light and thus rejected Hampton’s argument that his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Because the District Court denied Hampton’s
motion to suppress “[b]ased on [its] findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses to
this incident” (App. at 9), Hampton essentially challenges the District Court’s credibility
determinations regarding Officer McGrail and Collins.
It is well settled that where the record supports a district court’s credibility
determination, it is not for us to set aside. Kole, 164 F.3d at 177. This is because
“[c]redibility determinations are the unique province of a fact finder.” Id. Here, the
District Court chose to believe Officer McGrail’s testimony that the minivan had an unlit
passenger side brake light and to disbelieve Collins’ testimony that the police did not
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demonstrate to him that the brake light was inoperable. Because the record – Officer
McGrail’s repeated testimony and McDonough’s testimony that it was possible for the
brake light to operate intermittently – supports this determination, we will not set it aside
here. Therefore, since an unlit brake light is a violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303(b)
and “any technical violation of a traffic code legitimatizes a stop,” United States v.
Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996)), the District Court did not err by rejecting Hampton’s Fourth Amendment claim
and denying his motion to suppress.
B.
Hampton also contends that the application of a sentence enhancement under the
Armed Career Criminal Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment
by treating defendants who are armed career criminals, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.4, differently from defendants who are unarmed career offenders, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(h), U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2(a)(2), 4B1.1, 4B1.2. (App. at 38.) More
specifically, Hampton challenges the fact that the Armed Career Criminal Act counts his
prior convictions as three separate convictions, when the same convictions are counted
only once under the career offender guidelines. (App. at 38-40.) The Government,
contending that Hampton waived this argument in his Plea Agreement, requests that we
decline to reach this issue.
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We will decline to review the merits of Hampton’s appeal if the issue he pursues
falls within the scope of his appellate waiver and if he knowingly and voluntarily agreed
to the waiver, unless enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice. Corso,
549 F.3d at 927. We have stated that “waivers of appeals should be strictly construed,”
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001), and that the “defendant bears
the burden of presenting an argument that would render his waiver unknowing or
involuntary,” United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
Here, we find not only that Hampton waived his Equal Protection claim in his Plea
Agreement, but also that his claim is without merit. First, it is clear from the plain
language of the waiver, see Section (I), supra, that Hampton’s Equal Protection claim is
not one of the specified exceptions: Hampton’s 180-month sentence is below the
statutory maximum and within the guideline range, and Hampton’s Equal Protection
claim is distinct from the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) under the Commerce
Clause and Hampton’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Second, Hampton has failed to meet his burden of proving that the appellate
waiver was not knowing and voluntary. At the plea hearing, the District Court directed
Hampton’s attention to the Government’s description of the Plea Agreement, and the
Government described the appellate waiver provision. (App. at 261-62.) The Court then
asked Hampton whether he still wished to enter a plea of guilty. (App. at 273.) After
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clarifying a separate issue regarding theft, Hampton signed the Plea Agreement in open
court.2 (App. at 273-76.)
Finally, an examination of the merits of Hampton’s Equal Protection claim
demonstrates that enforcement of the appellate waiver will not result in a miscarriage of
justice. We have stated that “unless a statute creates a suspect classification or impinges
upon a fundamental interest, it will be upheld if the purpose of the classification bears
some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” United States v. Hawkins, 811
F.2d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1987). In Hawkins, we declined to question Congress’ finding that
most robberies and burglaries are committed by a small number of career criminals. Id. at
216-17. Accordingly, we held that there is a rational basis 3 for distinguishing between
three-time robbers/burglars and three-time other-category felons, such as murderers or
kidnappers, under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Id. If Congress was rational in
enhancing the sentences of robbers/burglars and not murderers and kidnappers, Congress
was clearly rational in treating armed career criminals more severely than unarmed career
criminals. Therefore, because Hampton’s Equal Protection claim is without merit,
enforcement of the appellate waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice.

2

Even assuming, arguendo, that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary,
Hampton’s Equal Protection claim still fails on the merits.
3

Hampton concedes that the rational basis standard applies.
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C.
Lastly, we turn to Hampton’s argument that Congress exceeded its powers under
the Commerce Clause in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hampton recognizes that we
examined this precise issue in detail in Singletary and held directly to the contrary. 268
F.3d at 204-05 (holding that “proof . . . that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce,
at some time in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element” of the
statute). Since Singletary remains the law of this circuit, precedent prevents us from
entertaining Hampton’s argument. See United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 183 (3d
Cir. 2002) (rejecting the defendant’s challenge to § 922(g) in light of the binding effect
we give to precedential opinions of this court).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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